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Revolution: ‘A forcible overthrow of a government
or social order, in favour of a new system’ (Pearsall
2001, p.1590).
The historian Norman Davies describes the defeat of a
Napoleonic army in 1808 in Andalusia by a band of
‘guerrilla fighters’ as showing ‘…how small bands of
determined fighters could contest the overwhelming force
of a professional army’ (Davies 1997, p.736).
The eventual surrender of 22,000 French soldiers was a
shock to conventional military logic and Davies goes on to
say (Davies 1997, p.736):
The guerrillas of Napoleonic Spain have had many
heirs, not least in the popular heroes of colonial wars
and the back-wood revolutionaries of Latin
America. But they have had their disciples in Europe
as well – in the Russian anarchists, in the partisans
and the maquisards of the Anti-Nazi Resistance
Movement, and, with the IRA or ETA, in the ‘urban
guerrillas’ of modern political terrorism.
Revolution and food are inextricably linked. The need
for food that supplies basic nutritional values to the masses
has been at the heart of many political upheavals; notably
the French Revolution in 1789 where the price and/or
scarcity of bread/grain led the ragged underclass to
challenge the power of the absolute monarch Louis XVI
which culminated in the overthrow and execution of the
king and the eventual downfall of the Ancien Regime. In
Russia in 1917 one of the sparks to revolution was the
inability of the authorities to provide bread for the
populace; the experience of spending forty hours a week
(Laudan, 2013) queuing (sometimes unsuccessfully) for
bread after have completed a week’s manual labour was just
too much for the urban industrial working-class women
and soon transformed into radical street protests.
The important role that adequate food provisioning by
the authorities plays can also be a buffer to armed
insurrection as the situation in Syria in 2016 shows. The
Ba’ath-ist regime had long subsidised bread, which is a
staple in the Arab world and when the regime lost control
of the wheat producing areas to ISIS forces, they were
quick to react and immediately started importing wheat
from Russia and Ukraine in order to maintain the flow of
subsidised bread to the populace and thereby presumably
the popular support of the masses, (www.bbc.com, 2016).
The war-time price increase of bread in regime-held areas is
230%; this contrasts with non-regime-held areas where the
increase has been 6500% in some cases.

Figures like these underpin the importance of food
supply as a tool for gaining popular support. The Roman
Annona is perhaps an early example of such an overt attempt
by the authorities to ‘buy’ the support from the masseshowever temporary that may be (Toussaint-Samat, 2009).
As in any undertaking food is crucial because the lack of
it prohibits the pursuit of success. Revolutionary groups are
subject to this as much as anyone. If the group is small, to
prosper it will need to have the goodwill of a support
community prepared to hide and feed them and provide
other essential logistical supports. This cannot be achieved
without the group having a common cause with the host
community. If the group is substantial in number then they
will have to requisition stores and foodstuffs from the
populace at large and this has the potential for causing the
host community to turn against the armed revolutionary
group. Therefore both situations are open to potential
problems. A third scenario is one by which the armed
revolutionary group liberates territory and the burden of
provisioning both guerrillas and civilians fall to it as it has
to behave as a de facto government with all the attendant
logistical issues that comes with it; not least the inevitable
conversion of important members of the group from
military cadres to civilian functionaries. This essentially
dilutes the group’s capability for armed struggle.
This research project has, by necessity, relied on a wide
ranging selection of secondary sources which has informed
the direction of this paper. It studies provisioning within
revolutionary movements with the aim of investigating the
food pathway used by revolutionaries under arms. The
immensely broad nature of such an undertaking has
suggested a narrower focus and this has led to the author to
decide to investigate two very different types of
revolutionary warfare:
Rural Guerrilla War as exemplified by the Cuban
revolutionary war by the 26th of July Movement and their
‘Jungle War’ in the Sierra Maestra mountains in the 1950s
or the Khmer Rouges in Cambodia in the 1970s and the
PLAF (Viet Cong) in Vietnam in the 1960/70s. These
revolutionary armies had different pressures on their food
provisioning – sometimes they had conquered territory and
were often acting as de facto governments or in contrast to
that were a jungle -or wilderness-based army who emerged
to attack the enemy and then melt back into the wild.
Urban Guerrilla War as exemplified by armed
insurrectionary groups such as the I.R.A. since the early
nineteen hundreds and the Rote Armee Fraktion (BaaderMeinhof) (RAF) in 1970’s and 80’s. This is necessarily
characterised by the anonymity of the revolutionary cadres
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and the need for them to fit into the background of society
often using safe houses and other counter-surveillance
techniques to avoid detection. This lifestyle is fraught with
danger and food provisioning as a daily essential poses
many barriers.
The shift from guerrilla war from its largely rural setting
to a largely urban setting came about from the 1960’s
onwards, inspired and motivated by the failures and
successes of the post-Cuban missions of Ernesto ‘Che’
Guevara and was best exemplified by the concept of foco.
The Spanish word means focus and in revolutionary theory,
refers to the concept of armed revolutionary groups
focussing their efforts on specific targets rather than
full-scale military encounters with the authorities. This can
be summed up as a policy of hit-and-run and represents the
huge leap made by insurrectionaries from living outside
society as armed revolutionaries to living within society as
armed revolutionaries.
Provisioning an army of revolutionary cadres, hundreds
or even thousands strong, is not easily achieved and despite
the disparity in numbers, the same is equally true of small
‘cells’ of Stadtgeurillas in their urban setting.
Glossary of terms
• 26th of July Movement: Cuban revolutionary
organisation founded in Mexico by Fidel Castro and
others. After a two year jungle war they eventually
overthrew the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959.
• Armée Revolutionnaire: Formed to perform grain
requisitioning and political commissary (food
provisioning) work during the French Revolution.
• Campesinos: Latin American term for subsistence
farmers who own very small plots of land.
• Foco: The concept of guerrilla warfare devised by
French author Regis Debray. Based on his observations
in Latin America in the 1960’s, it is a policy of hit and
run which moves the revolutionary cadre from the
jungle to the city, as the concept relies on engaging
popular support for a small group through revolutionary
action.
• Food Army: Armed battalions founded by the
Bolsheviks with specific responsibility for food
provisioning during the Russian Revolution and Civil
War, operated under the command of regional
procurement committees.
• FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
(Sandinista National Liberation Front
• I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army): Armed irredentist
group in Ireland, they sporadically attempt to subvert
British rule in Northern Ireland – Sometimes referred
to as the ‘Provisional’ I.R.A.
• ISIS: Armed Islamic group fighting in Syria and Iraq
with the aim of the overthrow of those legally
constituted governments and replacing them with an
Islamic Caliphate.

• Khmer Rouges: Cambodian revolutionary group led by
Pol Pot. After a long jungle war they took power and
ruled from 1975-1979.
• N.L.F. (National Liberation Front): Vietnamese
political organisation dedicated to re-unification of
Vietnam aka Viet Cong.
• P.L.A. (People’s Liberation Army): Chinese armed
forces originally the military wing of the Chinese
Communist Party, participated inter alia in the Civil
war and Long March.
• P.L.A.F. (People’s Liberation Armed Forces): Military
wing of the Viet Cong. With the North Vietnamese
armed forces, they were ultimately responsible for the
victory against the U.S. backed alliance that supported
the puppet regime in South Vietnam.
• R.A.F. (Rote Armee Fraktion / Red Army Faction):
Armed Marxist group based mostly in West Germany
and after reunification, Germany. Active between 1970
and 1998, often referred to as the Baader-Meinhof
group after two prominent founder-members.
• Red Army: Founded by Leon Trotsky. De Facto armed
forces of the Soviet Union from 1917 onwards,
responsible for the liberation of Russia from Tsarist rule.
• RZ (Revolutionäre Zellen /Revolutionary Cells): A Rote
Armee Fraktion affiliate in West Germany in the 1970’s
In the city
The history of Ireland is characterised by uprisings,
revolutions and rebellions against British rule and every
century has seen a serious attempt at obtaining freedom by
force of arms.
In the Seamus Heaney poem ‘Requiem for the Croppies’
(1966) which deals with the battle of Vinegar Hill in
Wexford in 1798, the decisive engagement of the United
Irishmen rebellion of that year, Heaney refers to the
absence of field kitchens and the rebougeel’s habit of
carrying barley in their pockets whilst conducting a
guerrilla war through ‘hedge and ditch’. The poem’s
melancholy climax then speaks of the thousands of rebels
killed and barley (from the pockets of dead rebels) growing
out their graves (Heaney, 2010).
The pockets of our greatcoats full of barley…
No kitchens on the run, no striking camp…
We moved quick and sudden in our own country.
The priest lay behind ditches with the tramp.
A people hardly marching… on the hike…
We found new tactics happening each day:
We’d cut through reins and rider with the pike
and stampede cattle into infantry,
then retreat through hedges where cavalry must be
thrown.
Until… on Vinegar Hill… the final conclave.
Terraced thousands died, shaking scythes at
cannon.
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The hillside blushed, soaked in our broken wave.
They buried us without shroud or coffin
and in August… the barley grew up out of our
grave.’
The poem may be considered a metaphor for food
provisioning, as again and again in Irish history the armed
insurgency can be seen to be accompanied by little
planning for food.
The most celebrated event in Irish political history is
usually considered to be the Easter Rising of 1916; often
just referred to as ‘Easter’ or ‘1916 or ‘the rising’’. The
events of Easter week provide an insight into the mind-set
of the leadership, who were intent on making the gesture of
defiance towards The British Empire, yet gave little or no
thought to the day to day provisioning of the volunteers
under their command.
The Easter Rising was conducted mostly but not
exclusively in Dublin where the rebels seized a number of
strategically located buildings and fortified them. They
were effectively in their home city and the idea of
occupying fixed positions against a militarily superior
enemy was a poor choice when contrasted with the urban
guerrilla warfare model that was subsequently employed
during the War for Independence (1919-1921). The main
rebel positions were the Royal College of Surgeons, St.
Stephens Green, The Four Courts, and Boland’s Mill, The
G.P.O. and the South Dublin Union.
All these positions, with the exception of St. Stephens
Green, an open air park, were buildings in urban or
inner-city Dublin. The rebels barricaded themselves in and
waited for the inevitable British response. As any military
undertaking requires military ordnance the rebel
leadership prudently gave thought to guns and
ammunition, which had occupied much of their pre-rising
efforts which saw guns landed in Howth Co. Dublin and
Kilcoole Co. Wicklow, however the provision of food
which is an essential seems to have been overlooked or at
best was an afterthought.
The garrison at St. Stephens Green was perhaps the most
exposed of all rebel positions therefore a lack of food could
not be easily remedied as they were surrounded by the
British, yet it seems from the start they suffered severe
shortages( O’Brien, 2013):
Food was still scarce, and continued to be rationed.
Many of the Volunteers collapsed at their posts
from lack of sustenance and had to be removed to
the sick bay. Commandant Mallin detailed a unit to
go through all the buildings in his perimeter and
search for supplies. This resulted in some finds, but
the lack of food was to remain a problem in the
coming days.
This was by no means restricted to the St. Stephens
Green outpost, the nearest garrison was the Royal College
of Surgeons (Shannon, 2006):
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Food and rations in the College like in the other
garrisons around the city were scare. Food could
only be obtained by tunnelling from house to house
between the College and Grafton Street. Mary
Donnelly was one of the women given the onerous
task of foraging for food.
Most garrisons used female volunteers for food foraging
and this was based on the precept that the British were less
likely to shoot women out of hand if found at large outside
the immediate combat zone.
Mary Donnelly a volunteer in 1916 said of her time in the
Royal College of Surgeons during the Rising (Shannon, 2006):
As each house was taken it had to be guarded and
this meant that food had to be carried under fire
from the lane beside the College and through rough
holes in walls where a bullet through the window
on landings threatened us as we clambered up
assisted by the men on guard in these lonely houses.
A big fire was lit in the fireplace of one of the large
classrooms to the rear of the College, which was
used to make porridge when eventually some
oatmeal was delivered to the garrison. According to
Countess Markievicz, ‘on Tuesday and Wednesday
we were absolutely starved. In the beginning men
coming off guard could only get a few cream
crackers, supplied by McDonagh from Jacob’s
factory, before trying to get some sleep.’
To the hungry volunteers, porridge and cream crackers
may have seemed like a feast but the absence of a serious
attempt to collect food supplies left the individual
garrisons living hand-to-mouth for the duration of Easter
week with varying degrees of success.
The General Post Office was the central location of the
Uprising and contained the Provisional Government
headed by P.H. Pearse and others. After one hundred years
of analysis and scrutiny, it is still not clear what the rebels
hoped to achieve, but an indication of possible intent can be
seen by the order below issued and signed by Pearse himself
which ordered volunteers to bring only eight hours rations.
The volunteer to whom this order was issued mobilised
at Rathfarnham Chapel in the southern suburbs of the city
(Fig. 1). We can surmise that the volunteer then marched
to one of the city-centre locations to man the barricades
and participate in the fighting all with no more than eight
hours rations which seems very little for men embarking
upon war with no prospect of replenishing their supplies
other than foraging. Furthermore there is evidence that
within the command structure of the G.P.O. there was an
over-zealous rationing policy in place.
Other garrisons fared better as they sent foraging parties
out early and were not so centrally located. A case in point
is the South Dublin Union which was commanded by
Éamonn Ceannt. The garrison under his command faced
similar food provisioning problems but were alleviated by
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Fig. 1 Mobilisation order signed by P.H. Pearse.

the fortunate capture during ambush of a delivery boy and
his cargo of ten chickens. The same garrison were also lucky
in that the next day they captured three calves. The South
Dublin Union, a workhouse, had the added advantage of
having volunteer Bob Holland in their group who was a
butcher by trade. They also had a ‘head cook’ within their
ranks and so had the expertise needed to feed the
volunteers using the workhouse kitchen. This helped the
supply of adequate nutrition but did not stop individual
volunteers from consuming their rations at will. One
volunteer named Thomas Young ate 48 hours rations in ten
minutes according to himself.
Other volunteers complained in retrospect that despite
the rebellion happening in their own city and its leaders
having perhaps twelve months’ notice of it that there were
no plans made to provide adequate food supplies.
In Jacobs’s factory the volunteers were entirely without
food and again relied on female volunteers to forage for
food. One forager found slabs of cooking chocolate and
distributed them amongst the volunteers. The female
foragers in this garrison also shared their meagre supplies
with the garrison at the Royal College of Surgeons where it
was reported that some female volunteers were passing out
through hunger (and no doubt fatigue) (Townsend, 2006).
The experience of fighting from fixed positions and the
subsequent ease with which the British regained control of
the city was a lesson well learned by the Irish rebels and by
the time the Easter Rising was over and the leaders had
been executed, the younger generation of rebel leaders were
getting ready to try again.
In contrast, the subsequent War for Independence was
characterised as having almost no full scale military
engagements and marked a shift towards modern guerrilla
warfare. The tactics of hit-and-run were adopted and thus the
necessity for rebels to melt into the background of society
became paramount. The method of warfare had changed and
so had the method of provisioning the combatants.
The new type of warfare was typified by the flying
columns in the rural areas and by small hit squads in the
urban areas. These two different types of approach required
the revolutionaries to take personal responsibility for their

day-to-day food needs, whether it was for a two day mission
in West Cork or reconnaissance duty in Dublin.
The flying columns were highly mobile ad hoc grouping of
riflemen used to operating in rural areas often with the tacit
approval and support of the populace at large, these were
highly successful in the war and were provisioned by their
own families and the goodwill of neighbours (Barry, 2010).
The most famous of the flying columns was the West Cork
Brigade commanded by General Commandant Tom Barry.
The West Cork Brigade numbered 310 men and it required
12,500 British military personnel to enforce the Pax Brittanica
in the region. Feeding 310 occasional soldiers was not an easy
task and Barry’s men had to take every opportunity to supply
themselves. On one occasion when some of them occupied a
‘big house’ belonging to a local Crown sympathiser, the
volunteers appeared to take great delight in plundering the
food stores. He recalls that there was:
… four rashers and four fried eggs for every man.
And that:
…the volunteers appeared to enjoy their first
experience of eating at the expense of one of their
enemies (Barry 2010, p.80).
The resourcefulness of these volunteers was a quality much
needed in a military theatre that has even less certainties
than conventional war.
Irish independence was achieved in 1922 with the
foundation of the Irish Free State; however the six north
easternmost counties had been retained under British Rule.
As a result, the Irish guerrilla war was continued albeit on a
smaller scale and now republican activists faced imprisonment
from their fellow Irishmen. During World War II, the Irish
State imprisoned a large number of republican activists,
some were detained without trial and some were tried and
sentenced for various crimes.
Brendan Behan the famous poet and playwright was a
member of the I.R.A and was imprisoned a number of
times by the authorities. His description of going on the
run in the 1940’s in an attempt to evade capture details his
use of a ‘safe-house’ where an elderly republican
sympathiser feeds and hides him and his colleague
overnight (Behan 1991, p.38):
… she took us in and gives us this plate of bacon and
cabbage, which was her own dinner for sure, as she
would hardly be likely to have food enough for
herself, let alone to spare, and a glass of porter …
and Jesus, Mary and Joseph wasn’t she apologising
for the sparsity of it all?
Behan and a colleague continue to avoid arrest and after
a spell in Belfast they attempt to re-join their units in
Dublin. On reaching a pub on the Dublin county border
Behan and his comrade order (Behan 1991, p.43):
A pint of stout myself. A Pint of stout?… So we had the
pint of stout and a crubeen each and a plate of bread and
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butter, and the steaming hot pig’s foot warmed us up for
the road and what we might have to face out there.
The use of safe houses continues but eventually the net
closes on Behan and he is arrested in Dublin’s inner-city whilst
stretching his legs after a breakfast of (Behan, 1991, p.47):
…a kipper, some mushrooms, tea with bread and
marmalade and butter…
Behan was eventually sentenced to fourteen years
imprisonment and as a political prisoner was locked up
with other members of the I.R.A. in the internment camp
in The Curragh where the prisoners were issued foodstuffs
and given access to kitchens and largely fended for
themselves. After a government amnesty which led to the
release of hundreds of these I.R.A. prisoners Behan is
transferred to a smaller holding facility with twenty-one
other republican detainees. He notes that the cooking is
better as it (Behan 1991, p.74):
…was now done by professional Free State Army
cooks rather than our own boys who had sketchy
ideas about what constituted cooking.
In an Irish context the use of the safe house was to
continue as a feature of armed rebellion for decades more
until the eventual ceasefire that came with the Good Friday
Agreement in 1998.
The urban guerrilla must know how to live among
the people, and he must be careful not to appear
strange and different from ordinary city life
(Marighella 2008, p.6).
The safe house and self-provisioning was heavily used in
West Germany in the 1970’s by the Rote Armee Fraktion
(RAF). The West German authorities called them the
Baader-Meinhof Gruppen and this grouping were born out
of student protests in the late 1960’s, eventually
transforming into an armed insurrectionary movement.
The tactics of the RAF were straightforward; they lived in
safe houses or squats/ communes and effectively lived
‘below the radar’ appearing as typical young students to the
outside world whilst waging an urban guerrilla war against
the Bund which including bank robberies, kidnappings,
assassinations and other subversive activities.
The food provisioning in the communes was similar to a
student house activity; a weekly shop was done and all
participants helped out with the cooking. The need to
appear unremarkable was essential so often the group took
short lets in major cities such as Frankfurt, Cologne and
Hamburg – houses rented as holiday lets or exam study
centres for students. The similarity to the clichéd student
house is striking. As one describes the atmosphere and
décor as (Becker 1978, p. 222):
…bare floorboards and bricks and planks … no
tablecloth … eating and drinking consisted of beer
and coffee and smoking cigarettes.
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In claustrophobic West Berlin the sharing of accommodation
was more commonplace and the cause of disputes. On one
occasion hungry cadres devoured a colleague’s wife’s plum
cake in its entirety, causing the colleague to question the
movement’s living arrangements, particularly the lack of
comfort available (Becker, 1978). In an attempt to
provision themselves more suitably the cadres bought small
gas stoves both for heating and cooking, this however was
not always utilised for food purposes as the revolutionaries
often ended up eating ‘…bread and sausage’ and drinking
Coke and Cognac (Becker 1978, p. 241).
The theme of food as a source of dispute and lack of
comfort resurfaced when some of the group’s senior cadres
were at a training camp in Jordan run by a Palestinian
group where they were fed basic rations which were not
popular (Aust 2008, p. 67):
They were served the scanty food on which the
Palestinians had been living for years: canned meat
donated by UNRRA, the United Nations refugee
relief organisation, generally mixed with rice. With
it they got flat cakes of Arab bread, water, fruit only
occasionally, fresh meat never. The Germans did
not like this diet, and complained from the start.
Despite their haphazard approach to provisioning
themselves, the RAF as a group understood the importance
of food as a means of building support amongst the wider
populace and one method used was to offer poor people state
benefits without the usual bureaucracy. In short they forged
food vouchers and distributed them amongst poor and
homeless families; this largesse was also extended to transit
passes for bus, tram and rail (Smith & Moncourt, 2009).
Between urban and rural
Any revolution will need a supply of food but the greater
the number of revolutionaries the greater the problems of
creating a viable supply-chain. This can be seen by
examining two large-scale revolutions, namely the French
Revolution of 1789 & the Russian Revolution of 1917.
These had many common points, including the nearstarvation of the urban poor and the contrasting luxury in
which the royal families were perceived to have lived being
a major catalyst for uprising in both cases. Food as the
cause of uprising is further developed when the actions of
the above revolutionary governments regarding food supply
are examined.
Both the French and the Bolshevik revolutionary
governments chose not only to ration food but also create
specialist military groups to collect, transport and
distribute foodstuffs. The French created the Armée
Revolutionnaire to carry out commissary duties i.e. to
provision the cities especially Paris by marching into rural
areas and collecting agricultural produce. The necessity for
this was shown by the pre-revolutionary guerre de farines
(Flour War) of 1774 (Wright 1974, p. 27):
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Bread prices increased to starvation levels and
created widespread unrest, resulting in attacks on
granaries …and rioting against bakers, farmers,
corn dealers, game laws and royal taxes.
In 1793, Robespierre, a senior member of the revolutionary
government demanded that an Armée Revolutionnaire be
formed with specific responsibility for collecting grain from
peasants in the rural areas. This Armée was to be constituted
from the ranks of the urban sans-culottes. This idea of
provisioning the revolutionary masses in the cities by
re-distributing the surplus grain being hoarded by avaricious
peasants is one that has a resonance beyond the French
Revolution and re-appears throughout revolutionary movements
in many different eras with strong echoes of later soviet
collectivisation. The French revolutionary government instituted
central requisitioning and the Armée Revolutionnaire report to
the general assembly on March 16th, 1794, highlighted the
importance of provisioning the revolution (Wright 1974, p. 134):
From the moment we have arrived here, we have
been occupied in arranging the provisioning of
Paris, several of our comrades, in the course of their
duties, have found eggs and butter hidden in the
cupboards in farmhouses and even grain hidden in
barrels … We ask that we be allowed to requisition
food and bring it to Paris.
In a report from Cityoen Le Grand who was a
revolutionary sent on a mission to Normandy specifically
charged with finding food supplies for Paris, he comments
that people are exhausted by’…the excessive increases in the
price of basic necessities and, even more so., by the rarity
and poor quality of bread…’ (Wright 1974, p. 128).
The Russian situation one hundred and twenty-odd
years later bore striking similarities, as shown by the bread
shortages in the urban areas prior to the October
revolution (Figes 1996, p. 605):
It all began with bread. For several weeks the
bakeries in Petrograd had been running out,
especially in the workers’ districts…the average
worker consumed fewer than 2,000 calories a dayless than half the recommended intake.
Figes discusses the breakdown of the market between
urban and rural areas and says: ‘…the real root of the urban
crisis was the peasantry’s reluctance to sell foodstuffs for
paper money’ (1996, p. 608). This reluctance to exchange
goods for Soviet-issued currency can be viewed as the
peasantry ‘hedging their bets’ as to the outcome of the civil
war which was raging between the Red Army and the
Tsarist ‘White’ Army at the time.
In 1920, the Bolshevik government, in a move towards
the ideal of a planned economy, took the first steps towards
universal state rationing. The Bolsheviks had decreed that
all surplus grain was to become the property of the state
and to expedite the collection; they formed the ‘Food

Army’. This adjunct of the military numbered 76,000
strong and took the initiative by forcibly seizing grain and
other food supplies all over the Soviet Union. It was
characterised by ‘The battle for grain’, exemplified by
armed brigades sent to countryside to requisition grain
from the rural peasantry by force (Figes, 1996).
As Civil War raged, the Food Army was divided into
‘food brigades’ who did the physical and sometimes
unpleasant work in conjunction with locally organised
party-inspired Committees of the Rural Poor. Later the
Bolsheviks introduced a ‘food levy’ which included not
only grains but all foodstuffs in order to provision the
urban populace during the ongoing civil war. In order to
safeguard the food supply to the cities, the Bolsheviks
examined how to guarantee nutritional minimums to the
populace and developed the idea of rationing.
The introduction of the ration coupon became an
important tool in the war against mass starvation and by
1920 the Soviet state was feeding thirty million urban
citizens via the implementation of work-place canteens (Figes,
1996, p. 727) – an impressive feat considering the civil war
and the attendant difficulties it posed to food provisioning.
The rural situation during the revolution was later dealt
with by the Bolsheviks by the collectivisation of agriculture,
which in theory would lead the rural peasants to a better
resolution than the previous situation which left them
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market-based economy. It
would be decades before the urban peasantry contemplated
collectivisation with anything approaching support.
The urban situation is contextualised by Carlos
Marighella shortly before his death in 1969 where he
highlights the differences in tactics needed by
revolutionaries in which he says conventional logistics
require, food, fuel, equipment and ammunition
(Marighella, 2008).
Marighella places a high degree of importance to food,
and goes on to point out the differences between
conventional armed forces and guerrilla forces
(Marighellea 2008, p. 13):
Conventional logistics refer to the maintenance
problems for an army or a regular armed force,
transported in vehicles, with fixed bases and supply
lines. Urban guerrillas, on the contrary, are not an
army but small armed groups, intentionally
fragmented. They have neither vehicles nor rear
areas. Their supply lines are precarious and
insufficient, and they have no fixed bases.
Therefore the urban guerrilla group is essentially a
smaller, clandestine movement which requires less formal
supply lines yet needs to eat each day.
Welcome to the jungle
The enduring image conjured up by the words guerrilla
warfare are perhaps the jungle-based endeavours of the
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Cuban Revolution or the decades-long Vietnam War, both
of which ended in military defeat for the conventional
armed forces. The difference between this war by guerrillas
on a grand scale and the hit-and-run tactics of the urban
equivalent is one of scale, exacerbated by the need to feed
large numbers of combatants and often assorted support
personnel and in some cases the need to take on the role of
administration in captured/ liberated territories.
This has been was written about at length by Dr.
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in a number of books, notably The
Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, Bolivian
Diary and Guerrilla Warfare.
Guevara led a column of the Cuban Rebel Army which
was the military wing of the 26th of July Movement from
its early struggle in the Sierra Maestra to the conflictdefining battle of Santa Clara, and eventual victory in
January 1959. Guevara, despite being an entry-level recruit
to the Rebel Army was highly educated and one of the
posts he took up in the revolutionary government was that
of head of the department of industry of the national
institute of agrarian reform – a position of utmost
influence to the food industry and one that the
revolutionary government considered so important that it
required the attention of the third-ranking officer in the
entire Rebel Army (Castro, 1994).
Guevara speaks much of nutrition in his books. As a
medical doctor, he knew the essentials and was quick to
instil good practices into the cadres under his command.
He wrote at length about the need for guerrilla fighters to
carry fat, salt, sugar and preserved foods as well as the
basics for cooking foods (Guevara 1969, p. 83):
…always it is necessary to assure a supply of the
fundamental food for the troop as well as some
kinds of fat which permit better food preparation;
these may be animal or vegetable fats.
The thrust of Guevara’s (1969) nutritional advice was
that as the guerrilla fighter may be isolated without food
sources from time to time, it was essential to carry extra
foodstuffs and have knowledge of how to extract the
maximum benefit from them. A warning to combatants
was framed thus: ‘…He (the guerrilla fighter) cannot count
on more than two or three friendly houses that will provide
food…’ (p.36). ‘The guerrilla fighter ought always to carry
some personal food besides that which the troop carries or
consumes in its camps’ (p.51).
In regard to safeguarding supplies he adds (Guevara
1969. p.29):
For all lines of supply that pass through the
country, it is necessary to have a series of houses,
terminals, or way-stations, where supplies may be
hidden during the day while waiting to be moved by
night. Only those directly in charge of the food
supplies should know these houses.
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In terms of accessing foodstuffs, Guevara insisted that if
the group were operating outside a ‘liberated zone’, then
any foodstuffs taken from the populace should be ‘paid’ for
by issuing of promissory notes and that a genuine attempt
to redeem the note in full or part should be made, and
sooner rather than later. This attitude was shared by other
rebel commanders as Fidel Castro, the leader of the
revolution says (Castro 2007, p. 214):
We paid the Campesinos with what very little we
had for every single thing we got from them, even if
they if they didn’t want to accept it, and we paid
them, I assure you, at a higher-than-market price.
As Marxists, the ideology of Castro and Guevara was
one of class war and they were careful to foster good
relations with the poor agricultural peasants and
Campesinos and it was important for the guerrillas to be
seen as the friend of the poor. This explains the insistence
on ‘paying’ for requisitioned stores.
Guevara further instigated a tax on farmers in rebel-held
zones. He imposed a tax on the sugar plantations and cattle
ranchers which may have been a move designed to elicit
food instead of cash, which was of more use to his group at
that time (Guevara, 2009).
The difference between operating in enemy controlled
zones and ‘liberated’ zones were stark as seen by the
following statements (Reid-Henry 2009, p. 168):
El Hombrito – Che’s zone as commandant had a
micro-state feel with its own Radio Rebelde and its
own news-sheet and crucially its own bread oven.
Contrasted with life in enemy territory: ‘…on the push west
which eventually would lead to the spreading of the
insurrection throughout the entire island, Guevara’s
column battle poor conditions and as well as the regime
and at point have only enough food to eat … once every two
days’ (Reid-Henry 2009, p. 189).
The inclusion of the agricultural peasants as part of a de
facto support network was a tactic used elsewhere such as
the Cuban-inspired Nicaraguan revolution by FSLN
guerrillas in the 1970’s. The Sandinistas, like their Cuban
counterparts, were heavily committed to agrarian reform
and early FSLN actions were reliant on peasant
participation (Collins et al, 1982, p. 22):
Both Campesinos (owners of small plots of land)
and landless agricultural workers joined the
guerrillas. One of the earliest attacks on the
National Guard was carried out by a Sandinista
guerrilla column made up totally of small farmers
and landless workers under the direction of Colonel
Santos Lopez…
Guevara left Cuba in the 1960’s after the success of the
revolution and dedicated his life to revolutions elsewhere.
It was in his final campaign in Bolivia that he died, but his
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diary entries from that campaign show a strong similarity
to the campaign waged in Cuba.
The Bolivian campaign was marked by smaller numbers
of participants and perhaps due to this, the daily struggle
to eat seems more marked. The column under Guevara’s
command became separated from their rear-guard and they
spent months trying to re-establish contact. The food issue
was always acute and at some points it seems as if the
strategic goals were being set aside in the simple hunt for
food and evading capture by the army.
Guevara speaks of these daily struggles candidly; he
describes slaughtering a horse and making Charqui (jerky)
out of the leftovers, and also describes catching and eating a
tátu (Armadillo) and this being consumed by the group.
The guerrillas lived mostly on peasant staples such as Mote
which is a kind of porridge made from cereal grains cooked
in the husk, or locro which was made from pork, rice, root
vegetables and potatoes, when they were lucky. Other foods
used were quechua soup, which consists of charqui, rice and
vegetables, again this is a staple in Bolivia. On another
occasion a soup was concocted from peanuts with hearts of
palm cooked in lard.
The diary gives a daily update on the food situation and
on March 18th 1967, he reports that they shot an Urina
which is a deer-like creature and so they ate well. On May
21st he records that they ate ‘extravagantly’ – stew, corn,
charqui and mote. They also ate a tapir and typically used
all their resources to feed themselves utilising mussels from
rivers and of course fish. This contrasts to March 14th when
he glumly reports that they have eaten the last of their food.
These accounts differ hugely from the perception –
eloquently outlined by Guevara’s comrade Inti Peredo that
(Guevara 1994, p. 356):
The erroneous impression exists that the guerrilla
sits comfortably at his camp, sleeping in a
hammock, eating a little bit; then a battle is
planned, there is an encounter with the army, the
dead and wounded are retrieved, and one returns to
camp to rest up.
The idealised view of the guerrilla existence would
appear to be far from the truth. Guevara’s campaign ends
on October 8th when he is wounded and captured in a
firefight and then executed the next day. In the days before
he died his diary records many expressions of thirst and a
reference to dinner of corn meal and tapir meat, a poor
ending for any venture.
The jungle-based revolutionary wars of South-East Asia
are treated with differing approaches. Much is known of the
conflict in Vietnam – due to the American involvement but
much less is known about the Cambodian conflict which
ran simultaneously during the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Nevertheless these neighbours fought jungle wars at the
same time and before a disastrous split between them,
shared many resources including perhaps the most wellknown supply chain ever used by armed insurgents that is

the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Named after the father of modern
Vietnam and Communist leader of North Vietnam, the
trail was used for decades by both the People’s Liberation
Armed Forces (P.L.A.F.) and the Khmer Rouges.
The Vietnamese were fighting to re-unite Communist
North Vietnam with the American-backed South. The
country was divided by a de-militarised zone (DMZ) which
made Northern infiltration to the south problematic
meaning that moving guerrillas and war materials and
foodstuffs was extremely difficult.
The Khmer Rouges were fighting a war against the rightwing American-backed Cambodian government led by the
Royal family. The Khmer Rouges and the NLF were
originally part of the wider Indo-Chinese Communist
Party which had fought against the French colonial
government and after independence, with the reestablishment of the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos
concentrated their efforts on national issues.
The problem that both groups had was that each had
different competing global sponsors; Vietnam were backed
by the Soviet Union but obviously had no border with
them. The Khmer Rouges were backed by Red China and
had no border with them.
Therefore Chinese assistance to The Khmer Rouges had
to go through Vietnam, and Soviet assistance to Vietnam
had to be flown direct to North Vietnam or go through
Chinese territorial land or waters. This made for difficulty
in an already confusing situation. The short term solution
for both was to co-operate in the spirit of common
anti-imperialism.
The trail started in North Vietnam and wound its way
through the heavily forested mountains crossing into Laos
and Cambodia eventually supplying bases near the
Vietnamese border, and from then the bases supplied the
frontline guerrillas in the Western jungles of Vietnam.
The Khmer Rouges had long been the junior partners in
the alliance and had did not have the luxury of a hinterland
to supply them. Their experiences in the jungle war led
them to eat almost anything including elephants, tigers,
wild dogs, monkeys and even moths (Short 2005, p. 146).
Food was a constant pre-occupation; the lack of
protein drove us to frenzied efforts at farming or
hunting whenever it was feasible.
One cadre referred to smoked elephant meat as their only
source of protein. The same guerrilla recalled a cooked
chicken being shared by thirty people in a jungle camp.
The trail was a constant target for American B-52
bombers and the continual attempts to disrupt the supply
chain affected Vietnamese and Cambodians alike. Pol Pot,
the Khmer Rouges leader, was returning from a meeting in
the North Vietnamese capital, Hanoi and it took four
months; twice the usual time because of American bombing
raids and search-and-destroy missions (Short, 2005).
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The Vietnamese and Cambodians moved essentials up
and down the Ho Chi Minh trail by hand and foot and by
bicycle and later by truck (Reynolds 2000, p. 281):
Using the network of trails along the jungle-clad
mountain range inside Laos, the North could
transport supplies slowly but surely into South
Vietnam, increasingly by truck but often by bicycle.
American B-52’s bombed what they called the Ho
Chi Minh Trail incessantly, but it was never closed.
From its humble jungle path beginnings, the trail
developed into a jungle highway that contained oil
pipelines and was used to transport everything from rice
and dried fish to surface-to-air missiles.
The Asian struggles were not confined to Indo-China. In
the mid-1930’s in China, the military wing of the Chinese
Communist Party (The Red Army a forerunner of the
P.L.A.) was forced to retreat west through hostile territory
and then north in order to join their comrades in safety. The
entire retreat was undertaken by around 80,000
Communists of which 40,000 were combat troops and with
the enemy Nationalist army in hot pursuit (Chang &
Halliday, 2005). The food provisioning of this many people
was an almost impossible feat and this is borne out by the
fact that only 10% of the combat troops survived the march.
The Red Army endured much hardship and the descriptions
of eating horses to the bone and chewing the leather from
their belts and even eating moss from trees give insight to
the food shortages (Chang & Halliday, 2005).
As they were essentially on the run they commandeered
crops en route from Tibetan peasants and justified it under
the guise of ‘taxation’. The entire march was undertaken so
that the Communist leadership would avoid capture and
was a success in those terms, yet the accounts from the
march speak of constant hunger and food shortages.
Conclusion
The business of armed insurrection is a dangerous one and
failure to provision adequately leaves the entire
undertaking in jeopardy. The successful armed revolutions
are those that plan for food shortages accordingly. The
commandeering of foodstuffs has been a widespread
practice and the offering of payment either in hard
currency or promissory notes will ameliorate the loss to the
agricultural producer somewhat. This is necessary for the
revolution to convey legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.
The more successful the revolution, the better the planning
and it is plain that very successful movements such as the
Vietnamese paid as much attention to food as they did to
munitions.
In 2016 perhaps food and revolution will have a
different face; this time the vanguard cadres will be the
upwardly mobile classes and the ‘foodie’ sub-group. The
counter-culture of the 1960’s and 1970’s has changed since
the days of William Powell’s ‘Anarchist Cookbook’ and
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today we are seeing what is being called the counter-cuisine
(Naccarato & Lebesco, 2012):
…the gradual effect of counter-cuisine insinuating
itself into mainstream food culture perhaps
showing that revolution sometimes relies on
evolution…
The revolutions of the future may be about food and not
reliant on it.
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